We propose a formal definition of Wolfram's notion of computational process based on iterated transducers together with a weak observer, a model of computation that captures some aspects of physics-like computation. These processes admit a natural classification into decidable, intermediate and complete, where intermediate processes correspond to recursively enumerable sets of intermediate degree in the classical setting. It is shown that a standard finite injury priority argument will not suffice to establish the existence of an intermediate computational process.
of Turing reducibility and Turing degrees. Post was particularly interested in the degrees of recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets. The Turing degrees of r.e. sets together with the order induced by Turing reducibility form a partial order and in fact an upper semi-lattice R. It is easy to see that R has least element ∅, the degree of decidable sets, and a largest element ∅ ′ , the degree of the halting set. Post asked whether there are any other r.e. degrees and embarked on a program to establish the existence of such an intermediate degree by constructing a suitable r.e. set.
The solutions to Post's problem required a new technique now called a priority argument that has since become one of the hallmarks of computability theory. Interestingly, the technique was invented independently and nearly simultaneously by Friedberg and Muchnik, see [13, 34] . Our structural understanding of R has grown significantly over the last half century, see [47] for a slightly dated but excellent overview or [1] for a more recent account. The Friedberg-Muchnik result shows that a 4-element partial order with a least and largest element, plus two incomparable elements, can be embedded into R. As it turns out, every countable partial order can be embedded into R. This fact leads to the decidability of the Σ 1 theory of R: in essence, a Σ 1 sentence over R is true unless it is clearly contradictory. According to a theorem by Sacks, the partial order of the r.e. Turing degrees is dense: whenever A < T B for two r.e. sets A and B there is a third r.e. set such that A < T C < T B, [41] . It is known that the ∀ 3 -theory of R is undecidable, the status of the ∀ 2 -theory is currently open. Overall, the first order theory of R is highly undecidable [19] .
A few years ago, Wolfram [58] suggested that ". . . all processes, whether they are produced by human effort or occur spontaneously in nature, can be viewed as computations." This assertion is not particularly controversial, though it does require a somewhat relaxed view of what exactly constitutes a computationas opposed to an arbitrary physical process such as, say, a waterfall. Note Searle's objections [42] against an overly simplified understanding of physical computation. Wolfram then goes on to make a rather radical proposition, the so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE, for short): ". . . almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophistication." The reference contains no definition of what exactly constitutes a computational process, or what is meant by sophistication, so it is a bit difficult to take issue with the assertion. However, most recursion theorists would agree that PCE coexists uneasily with the well-established theory of the r.e. degrees. Wolfram's response to such criticism can be summarized thus [57] : "Any of the standard constructions of an intermediate r.e. set achieves precisely that, it constructs a particular r.e. set that is undecidable yet fails to be complete. However, the construction as a whole, when interpreted as a computational process, is very different from the set so constructed. Most notably, the process makes heavy use of universal Turing machines and may thus well be complete when viewed in its entirety." As a concrete example, consider the standard Friedberg-Muchnik construction which produces two r.e. sets A and B that are incomparable with respect to Turing reductions and thus necessarily intermediate. However, it was shown by Soare that the disjoint union A ⊕ B is in fact complete, see [46] . If we were to implement the construction as a concrete device, say, a kind of pinball machine as suggested by Lerman [27] for the infinite injury case, it is hard to see how this device could be construed as not performing a universal computation. The corresponding computational process would indeed be complete.
The difficulty in identifying intermediate processes is closely related to another often observed problem with intermediate degrees: all existence proofs of intermediate degrees are artificial in the sense that the constructed r.e. sets are entirely ad hoc. This was perhaps stated most clearly by M. Davis [8] : "But one can be quite precise in stating that no one has produced an intermediate r.e. degree about which it can be said that it is the degree of a decision problem that had been previously studied and named." More recently, Ambos-Spies and Fejer in [1] are equally forceful about the lack of natural intermediate problems: "The sets constructed by the priority method to solve Post's Problem have as their only purpose to be a solution. . . . Thus it can be said that the great complexity in the structure of the c.e. degrees arises solely from studying unnatural problems." Nonetheless, results from degree theory have been transferred to other areas. For example, Boone [3] has shown how to construct a finitely presented group whose word problem has a given, arbitrary r.e. degree. Of course, the translation itself is entirely unsuspicious, it is only the instantiation required in particular to produce intermediate degrees that is unsatisfactory. In a similar vein, it was shown by Feferman that derivability in a formal theory fully reflects the structure of the r.e. degrees: for every r.e. degree d there is an axiomatizable theory whose collection of theorems has degree exactly d, see [10] . For a more recent and more complicated application of degree theory to differential geometry see Soare's contribution to the proof of Gromov's theorem, [48] .
There appears to be a fairly strong connection between the lack of natural intermediate degrees and PCE. Indeed, any of Davis' previously studied and named decision problems could presumably be translated into an intermediate computational process. For example, following a suggestion by H. Friedman, suppose one can identify a simple formula ϕ of, say, Peano arithmetic such that Th(ϕ) has intermediate degree. Any standard enumeration of all theorems provable from ϕ would then constitute an intermediate computational process. Of course, at present no one knows how to construct such a formula.
It is interesting to note that in the realm of generalized recursion theory different answers to Post's Problem appear. For example, in β-recursion theory the existence of an intermediate set depends on various properties of the limit ordinal β, see [14, 15, 16] . For infinite time Turing machines the answer depends on details of the underlying definitions, notably whether one considers single points or sets of reals, see [18] . In a more algebraic spirit, the Blum-Shub-Smale model of computations over the reals admits a surprising explicit solution for Post's Problem, see [32] : the set of rationals is intermediate in the BSS model. Of course, none of these examples seem to have any conceivable bearing on a physics-like model of computation.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a plausible definition of a computational process and to study the existence of intermediate processes in this framework. In section 2 we give a definition that is modeled closely on discrete dynamics and in particular on cellular automata. We will show that some complexity results transfer over to the computational process point of view, while others do not. In section 3 we consider directly finite injury priority arguments, the traditional source of intermediate r.e. sets. As we will see, at least the standard minimal construction fails to produce an intermediate process. We discuss possible further directions and open problems in the last section. To keep this paper reasonably short we will refrain from introducing standard concepts and notation from recursion theory and refer the reader to texts such as [38, 47, 7] .
Computational Processes and Observers
It stands to reason that any definition of a computational process in Wolfram's sense should capture some aspect of a physical computation rather than the purely logical structure of such a computation as expressed, say, by Kleene's schemata. Indeed, the following observation is attributed to David Deutsch: "The theory of computation has traditionally been studied almost entirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. This is to miss the point of it. Computers are physical objects, and computations are physical processes. What computers can or cannot compute is determined by the laws of physics alone, and not by pure mathematics." Many mathematicians would probably take exception to this view and indeed there is a bit of a culture clash between physicists and mathematicians, see for example Max Born [4] . Yet Deutsch makes an important point: the kinds of computations that can be physically realized, at least in the context of some idealized model of physics, are not well represented by the purely mathematical theory of computation. Alas, Hilbert's challenge to find an axiomatization of physics is still unanswered after more that a century, so it is difficult to address precisely all physical aspects of computation. Note that feasibility is not an issue here: we are not concerned with computations that could be accomplished within certain space, time or energy bounds such as the ones that prevail in our physical universe. Rather, we assume an unlimited supply of memory and unbounded time, as is implicit in the abstract theory of computation, as opposed to the fine-grained analysis of computational complexity theory.
Early work in computability theory is notoriously formal and terse, but Turing [54] and Post [37] provide a clear path towards physical representations of computations. First, Turing machines could be realized as physical systems (though, for reasons of efficiency, other models of computation are preferable when it comes to design of actual digital computers). Second, Post's emphasis of r.e. sets as collections of natural numbers that are constructed in stages lends itself easily to physical realization: we clearly could construct a device that gen-erates the elements of an arbitrary r.e. set one after the other in the sense that it will construct the physical representations of these elements.
From the proof-theoretic perspective, it is known that P − + IΣ 0 + BΣ 1 , a weak fragment of Peano arithmetic, suffices to prove the Friedberg-Muchnik theorem and thus the existence of intermediate sets, see [5] . This system contains the usual axioms for addition, multiplication and exponentiation but induction is restricted to Σ 0 formulae. Furthermore, Σ 1 -collection is also allowed: the application of a computable (i.e., Σ 1 -definable) function to a finite set produces another finite set. It would be difficult to imagine that any of these axioms collide with the laws of physics. For example, one can realize the computation of a Σ 1 -definable function as a search process where the search space consists of the representations of the natural numbers, presumably a collection of simple physical objects that can be generated on demand. Σ 1 -collection can then be realized by constructing a finite collection of image objects under a Σ 1 -definable function, perhaps by placing their representations into a certain bounded region of space.
We are here not interested in entering into an ontological discussion about the relationship between physics and mathematics, see for example Mycielski [35] for a definition of a typed structure built on top of the reals that he claims to coincide with the realm of "mathematical objects that have a potential for direct physical interpretations." Nor are we interested in recent suggestions that certain realizable physical constructs might be used to break through the "Turing barrier." For example, it has been proposed that a neural net might be used to solve the Halting Problem, [45] . In reality it would seem to take considerable effort to make neural nets perform any computations in the recursion theoretic sense; see [30] where is shown that in the presence of Gaussian noise neural nets cannot even recognize all regular languages. We refer the reader to Davis' excellent paper [9] for a comprehensive discussion of these ideas.
In the absence of a solution to Hilbert's Sixth problem one can only hope to establish some general principles that seem to apply to all physical computations. Perhaps the most far-reaching attempt in this direction is Gandy's formulation of four fundamental principles that describe a very general model of parallel computation, see [17] and also [43, 44] . Gandy's goal is to establish his "Thesis M" which states that everything that can be computed by a machine can also be computed by a Turing machine. The model is based on hereditarily finite sets over a countable set of indistinguishable urelements, corresponding to elementary components of a computational device such as atoms or other particles. In the reference, Gandy gives a long list of counterexamples that demonstrate that his conditions cannot be further relaxed: any conceivable modification leads to machines that "display free will," i.e., that can compute any number theoretic function.
To avoid the significant technical difficulties of Gandy's approach we will stay closer to Zuse's and Fredkin's idea, adopted by Wolfram [59, 12, 58] , but discouraged by Mycielski, of modeling physics by some type of cellular automaton.
As a consequence, we are dealing with countable and locally finite structures. It is easy to see that all these automata conform to Gandy's principles. A cellular automaton is a continuous shift-invariant map on a Cantor space of the form Σ Z d where Σ is some finite alphabet. For our purposes it is convenient to consider the one-dimensional case d = 1. Of course, more realistic models with abundant conservation properties such as Fredkin's SALT automata [33] would employ higher dimensions but this would only complicate our arguments. Thus we have a global map G acting on Σ Z , the space of all configurations. A cellular automaton has a finite description since, by continuity and shift-invariance, G is induced by a finite map g : Σ w → Σ where w ≥ 1, the so-called local map of the automaton.
Note that G can be computed by a rational transducer operating on bi-infinite words. To avoid issues with higher-type computability we focus on the subspace Σ Z 0 of configurations X of finite support: suppose 0 ∈ Σ and allow only finitely many positions i ∈ Z such that X(i) = 0. We may safely assume that the global map preserves finite supports. Hence we can identify configurations with finite words over Σ. The one-step operation in a process will be given by a functional rational transductions, a slightly more general concept than the word maps induced by cellular automata. Clearly the orbit of any configuration is then automatically r.e.
We can now propose a formal definition of a computational process. For our purposes, a computational process over some alphabet Σ is a pair P = τ, X where τ is a finite state transducer over Σ and X ∈ Σ ⋆ a word. We will conflate τ and the map that it induces on Σ ⋆ and refer to τ as the computor and to X as the initial configuration of P . Thus we can obtain a sequence of configurations by iterating τ on X: X t = τ t (X).
We need to explain how to extract information from this sequence. As Searle [42] points out, "Computational states are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the physics." A physical system is not intrinsically a computer, rather it is necessary to interpret certain features of the physical system as representing a computation. Some processes lend themselves naturally to interpretation as a computation, but others may require interpretations of considerable sophistication (e.g., the elementary cellular automaton number 110 from above). The act of interpretation of a physical system is performed by an observer. For our purposes we define an observer to be a word function ρ on Σ that is computable in constant space. We associate the language O ρ = { ρ(X t ) | t ≥ 0 } with the observer. We refer to O ρ as the observation language of ρ. It follows from the definitions that this language is always r.e.
The computor is narrowly constrained so as to make sure that a single step in the process is very simple and in particular cannot hide complicated subcomputations. For example, the computor cannot perform a whole stage in a Friedberg-Muchnik type construction in a single step, see below. The observer on the other hand has the ability to filter out some part of the current configuration and rewrite it slightly. Of course, there is always on observer whose observation language is trivial. We are here interested in the case where the observer focuses on an interesting part of the computation. Since we do not wish for the observer to able to artificially inflate the complexity of the observation language it is important that the observer is strictly constrained in computational power. For example, suppose we were to allow an arbitrary primitive recursive word function to be applied to X t . The observer could then ignore the input and simply launch an independent computation of his own. In particular, as long as lim sup |X t | = ∞ the observer could always produce a complete observation language. Thus even an entirely trivial computational process where X t = 0 t would admit a maximally complicated observation.
We can now classify computational processes according to the complexity of the associated observations. A computational process is undecidable if there exists an observer whose observation language is undecidable. Likewise, a computational process is complete if there exists an observer whose observation language is r.e.-complete. The process is intermediate if it is undecidable but fails to be complete. Thus, an intermediate computational process admits at least one observer that finds the process undecidable but prohibits any observer from extracting a complete r.e. set.
As Wolfram's work in the early 1980's showed, careful visual inspection of the images obtained by plotting part of an orbit (X t ) t≥0 as a two-dimensional spacetime diagram can produce some measure of insight in the computational properties of the system. For example, figure 1 shows part of an orbit of two elementary cellular automata, ECA 30 on the left and ECA 110 on the right. Here we have used the standard numbering system: for any integer r, 0 ≤ r < 256, we obtain an elementary cellular automaton by expanding r in binary to eight bits r 7 r 6 . . . r 0 , padding on the left with 0's if necessary. Then the 3-bit local configuration abc is mapped to r 4a+2b+c . For ECA 30, the patterns appear to lack any clear and easily predictable structure. Indeed, this elementary cellular automaton has been used as a pseudo-random number generator, see [56] . The geometric structure of the orbit of ECA 110 on the other hand is rather surprisingly complicated and there are lots of persistent, localized structures. It is not inconceivable that, given proper initial conditions, this type of behavior might be exploited to perform computations. This turns out to be indeed the case as shown by Cook [6] ; the proof is quite difficult, however, and requires bi-infinite, albeit ultimately periodic, configurations. In fact, it would be rather challenging to present this argument in a purely non-geometric way suitable by verification through a proof-checker. On the other hand, it is quite straightforward to simulate Turing machines on finite configurations when one has control over the cellular automaton. In particular, it is not hard to construct complete computational processes.
The power of a computational process comes from iteration, the relational structure C τ = Σ ⋆ , τ itself is computationally trivial in the sense that it has decidable first order theory, see [49] . We note in passing that this result also holds over the full space Σ Z of infinite configurations when the transduction stems from a cellular automaton; alas, the machinery required to establish decidability is quite a bit more complicated. Dimensionality is crucial here, no similar result holds in dimensions two or higher. It was pointed out by Finkel that one can use methods from ω-automaticity to extend this result to include various counting quantifiers, see [11] .
Thus, undecidability requires us to consider whole orbits rather than just fixed size segments. In any system such as monadic second order logic or transitive closure logic that allows us to express the Reachability Problem for C τ : "Does configuration y appear in the orbit of configuration x?" we should expect undecidable propositions in the general case. Note that the Reachability Problem is trivially r.e. Also, if we think of the computation of the orbit as a computational process starting at x there is an observer ρ that can check whether a fixed configuration y appears, so Reachability is easily expressible in our framework.
Since our notion of computational process is motivated by cellular automata it is worthwhile to consider standard classifications of these systems and how they relate to computational processes. Classifications of cellular automata are more or less based on attempts to transport concepts from classical dynamics into the realm of cellular automata, perhaps augmented by ideas from recursion theory, see [55, 58, 28, 29, 25, 26] . As one might expect, from a computational perspective these are all fraught with undecidability. For example, it is Π 0 2 -complete to determine whether all orbits end in a fixed point, it is Σ 0 3 -complete to determine whether all orbits are decidable, and it is Σ 0 4 -complete to determine whether a given cellular automaton is computationally universal, see [50, 51] . It was suggested in [53] to turn this difficulty into a tool: one can use the complexity of Reachability to classify cellular automaton in a much more finegrained manner than usual.
To this end, define C d to be the collection of all cellular automata whose Reach-ability Problem has degree exactly d, some r.e. degree. Note that this is a significantly stronger condition than having a cellular automaton that is capable of, say, enumerating a set whose degree is d: only a few of the orbits of the cellular automaton will correspond to actual computations of the corresponding Turing machine (or whatever other computational model the automaton may emulate). It requires a bit of care to make sure that the other orbits do not violate the degree condition. At any rate, we have the following result, see [52, 53] . Theorem 2.1 Degree Theorem For every r.e. degree d there is a one-dimensional cellular automaton whose Reachability Problem has degree precisely d. In fact, the cellular automaton can be chosen to be reversible.
Thus, the whole complexity of the upper semi-lattice R of the r.e. degrees is fully reflected in this classification of cellular automata. In fact, the situation is even a bit more complicated: we can fine-tune various computational aspects of the cellular automaton in question. For example, consider the natural Confluence Problem: "Given two configurations, do their orbits overlap?". Of course, the Two Degree theorem cannot possibly hold when one considers only reversible cellular automata: in this case confluence of x and y is equivalent with x being reachable from y or y being reachable from x.
Needless to say, the proofs given in the references for all these degree related results on cellular automata are based on the existence of intermediate r.e. sets. More precisely, they employ somewhat complicated simulations of an arbitrary Turing machine M by a cellular automaton that ensures that the degree of the Reachability problem for the cellular automaton is precisely the same as the degree of the acceptance language of M . If we were to to reinterpret these arguments in terms of computational processes the process would have to include the simulation of a Turing machine with intermediate acceptance language. It is these sub-computations that push the degree of the Reachability problem up to the chosen degree, and it is the overall construction using restarting Turing machines that keep it from exceeding the target degree. Alas, it is not hard to construct an observer that extracts details of the computation performed by M . As we will see in the next section, at least for the standard choice of M , this means that the computational process admits a complete observation and is thus not intermediate.
Observers versus Intermediate Sets
The choice of observer can be critical in determining the complexity of the observation. Consider a process that enumerates all pairs (e, x) ∈ N × N such that x ∈ W e in stages, using the standard dovetailing procedure. Whenever a pair is found, the configuration # e# x#w ∈ #2 ⋆ #2 ⋆ #Γ ⋆ is generated where z denotes the binary expansion of z and # is a special separator symbol. Obviously one can design an observer ρ e such that O ρe = { x | x ∈ W e } ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ / ∈ 2 ⋆ is a default output emitted by the observer program whenever the current configuration is not of the proper syntactic form. Hence, every r.e. degree appears as the observation of this process. Similarly we can construct a computational process and a canonical observer that produces any particular intermediate degree. Alas, in order to obtain an intermediate process we have to make sure that all possible observers fail to produce a complete observation.
There are several variants of the finite injury priority argument due to Friedberg and Muchnik. We will here use a fairly general framework due to Sacks that is based on effective Baire categoricity, see [39, 36] for background. Sacks' method separates the combinatorial aspects of the construction very nicely from the computability aspects. It seems particularly appropriate for our purposes since the construction produces a single r.e. set. In this setting, a requirement is a family of pairs of finite sets
with the intent that the set T ⊆ N to be constructed should contain C i but be disjoint from D i for some i ∈ I. Let F : N → P ω (N) be a computable bijection and let . . . and (.) i be the usual coding and decoding functions. For any set X ⊆ N let even(X) = { i ∈ N | 2i ∈ X } and odd(X) = { i ∈ N | 2i + 1 ∈ X }. As is customary, we often identify a set with its characteristic function. Given a function E : N → N we can define the eth requirement (with respect to E) to be
Thus, E is used to enumerate requirements. Note that if E is computable then R e is r.e. It is convenient to set η(s) = (E(s)) 2 and call s an e-stage if η(s) = e. When E is clear from context we also write C s for F (E(s))0 and D s for F (E(s))1 .
In a moment we will associate a so-called priority set T ⊆ N with E; the definition of T is in ω stages s ≥ 0. Requirement R e is met or receives attention at e-stage s if
On the other hand, requirement R e is injured at stage s if it was met at stage t < s but now
Thus, a requirement R e that is met at some stage and not injured afterwards will produce a priority set that lies in the open set
Here is the construction in detail. At stage 0 set T 0 = ∅. Now consider a stage s > 0, say, an e-stage. The default action is to set T s = T <s provided one of the following three conditions obtains.
• D s ∩ T <s = ∅.
• There is an e-stage t < s such that R e was met at stage t and has not been injured since.
• There is an e ′ -stage t < s such that e ′ < e, R e ′ was met at stage t and has not been injured since but would be injured now if R e were to receive attention.
In all other cases we set T s = T <s ∪ C s .
Intuitively, in the first case we cannot work on R e since the disjointness condition is violated (of course, we are not allowed to remove elements from T ). In the second case we are on the way to achieving T ∈ O e , so there is nothing to do. The third case is really the heart of any priority construction: while we could enter elements into T to satisfy R e we refrain from doing so because the injury caused to R e is due to a requirement R e ′ of higher priority. In this case we have to wait till another possibility to meet R e arises, one that does not conflict with R e ′ . Note that by construction T is automatically r.e. in E. The key point is that the enumerating function T can be constructed alongside with T , so that E is computable and T is r.e.
Of course, there is no reason that all requirements would be met by this construction; however, all sufficiently well-behaved requirements will be met. More precisely, a requirement R e is said to be E-dense if for every finite set A there is an e-stage s > 0 such that
The fundamental result due to Sacks [39] is then this.
Theorem 3.1 ) Let E be a function enumerating requirements. Then the corresponding priority set satisfies all E-dense requirements.
Sacks' construction can naturally be translated into a computational process in our sense. This translation is straightforward in principle but rather too tedious to be carried out in reality in any detailed manner (for example, by explicitly constructing the transition table for the transducer). One possible approach is to first rephrase the construction as a Turing machine and then to code the instantaneous descriptions of the Turing machine as words over some suitable alphabet. Note that in this setting a single step in the computation can indeed be computed by a transducer. There are several ways to deal with the priority set T . For example, one could mimic a write-only output tape by using multiple tracks and write finite monotonic approximations to T into one of these tracks. The appropriate observer ρ can then simply read from this virtual output tape. Of course, the observer could also inspect other tracks but, as we shall see, even just reading the priority set causes problems.
It remains to show how one can construct an intermediate set in Sacks' framework. In order to spoil a potential observer that is trying to extract additional information from a computational process it seems reasonable to rely on the least complicated construction of an intermediate degree known. The following approach seems to satisfy this criterion. Informally, we wish to construct two r.e. sets A and B that satisfy the "requirements"
Here we follow Sacks in using quotation marks to differentiate these conditions from the formal requirements spelled out in the construction above. The first group of "requirements" ensures that A is simple and thus not decidable; the second group guarantees that A cannot be complete, a fact witnessed by B.
Set A = even(T <s ), B = odd(T <s ) and e = (s) 0 . Now consider some stage s > 0. The default action is to set C s = D s = ∅ and η(s) = 0 unless one of the two following situations arises.
Case 1: (s) 1 is even and there exists an x, 2e < x < s such that x ∈ W s e . Let x 0 be the maximal such x and set C s = {2x 0 }, D s = ∅ and η(s) = 2e.
Case 2: (s) 1 is odd and there exists a u, u ∈ e, N and u < s, such that {e} This completes the construction.
Clearly, E is computable since all the computations required at stage s are primitive recursive, uniformly in s. For example, in the first case E(s) = F −1 ({2x 0 }), F −1 (∅), 2e + 1 . Hence T and also A = even(T ) and B = odd(T ) are r.e., as required. Note that, in case 1, the construction has uncovered a witness for P e and tries to place this witness into A. In case 2, the potential witness u to N e succeeds in the sense that, at stage s, {e} A asserts that the witness is not in B. Therefore, we place it into B and protect the part of A that is relevant for the computation of {e} A s (u 0 ). It is clear that if the corresponding requirements are met, and not injured again at a later stage, we will have managed to establish our "requirements."
One minor complication remains: by Sacks' theorem we only know that all Edense requirements are met, it remains to deal with non-dense requirements. For the requirements R 2e , corresponding to the positive P e , this is not an issue: the requirements are trivially dense whenever W e is infinite. For R 2e+1 , corresponding to the negative N e , we need to distinguish two cases. First, if the requirement is E-dense one can invoke theorem 3.1 to conclude that it must be met at some stage s, whence {e} A ≃ B. So suppose the requirement fails to be E-dense. Then there is a finite set F such that for all (2e + 1)-stage s we have C s ⊆ T <s or F ∩ C s = ∅. Now choose the least witness u ∈ e, N that is larger than max F . If u ∈ B then 2u + 1 must have entered T at (2e + 1)-stage s via C s = {2u + 1}. But then C s ⊆ T <s , contradiction. Hence u / ∈ B and it remains to show that {e} In summary, the construction yields r.e. sets T = even(T ) ⊕ odd(B) that satisfy our informal "requirements" from above and, in particular, an intermediate set A which can be obtained from T by erasing all odd numbers. However, the actual construction is not at liberty to maintain only the even part of T . Hence, when cast as a computational process an observer could also extract B or all of T . Unfortunately, this renders the process complete. To see this note that the witnesses e, i associated with negative "requirement" N e can be viewed as an S 2 -function u(e, s) such that the limit u(e) = lim u(e, s) exists for all e. Initially u(e, 0) = 0 and u(e, s) changes value only when s is a (2e + 1)-stage at which R 2e+1 is met. Observe that on odd number 2v + 1 can enter T at a (2e + 1)-stage only if v = e, i , i.e., if it is a potential witness set aside for the "requirement" N e . Thus, using T as an oracle, we can compute u(e). Now choose a recursive function f that witnesses membership in the jump of A as follows:
e ∈ A ′ ⇐⇒ {f (e)} A (z) ≃ 0 for all z.
Then e ∈ A ′ ⇐⇒ {f (e)} A (w(e)) ≃ 0 ⇐⇒ u(e) ∈ A so that A ′ ≤ T T and we are done.
Similar arguments seem to apply to all finite injury priority constructions of intermediate sets. In fact, it was suggested by Jockusch and Soare in [22] that priority constructions obey a kind of "maximum degree principle" in the sense that the construction of an r.e. set with weak negative requirements automatically produces a complete set. If the requirements are strong enough to prevent completeness of the set there are still remnants of completeness in the construction. This type of completeness is hidden in the standard recursion theoretic argument since the ostensible output is obtain by filtering the priority set, but becomes visible when we recast the argument as a computational process. Thus we have the following result. There are variants of this construction that produce stronger results. For example, Sacks [40] has shown how to modify the construction so that A can be any given undecidable r.e. set and we obtain S such that A ≤ T S. Thus S avoids a whole upper cone rather than just complete sets. Alas, as a computational process the construction requires us to furnish an enumeration of A which apparently requires a complete process.
Open Problems
We have proposed a notion of computational process that is motivated by discrete dynamical systems that provide a physics-like model of computation. We have verified that standard finite injury priority arguments, when interpreted as computational processes in this sense, produce complete rather than intermediate processes. In light of the Jockusch/Soare maximum degree principle it is difficult to imagine a variant of a priority argument that would circumvent this problem. We conjecture that this obstruction is truly general.
A number of questions come to mind. First and foremost, is there a way to hide information from any observer so that only the desired intermediate observations can take place? Recall that we require observers to be constant space computable. On the other hand, the computor is likewise incapable of performing complicated computations in a single step, so it is unclear whether relevant information can be kept from the observer. Second, it would be interesting to constrain the model of computation that motivates our definition of computation process further in the direction of making it a closer match to actual physical computation. For example, one could consider higher-dimensional cellular automata that are reversible and in addition obey certain conservation laws, much in the spirit of Fredkin's recent work on SALT [33] . The motivation for Fredkin is the construction of physically feasible, three-dimensional systems that dissipate as little energy as possible. It is conceivable that a narrow class of such systems could maintain universality while eliminating intermediate processes.
Of course, the existence of a "natural" intermediate degree would derail such efforts. It should be noted that the first order theory of two-and thus higherdimensional cellular automata is already undecidable, so some additional care may have to be taken to make sure that the one-step relation in a computational processes suitable to model such devices is sufficiently simple. Third, Kucera gave a priority-free solution to Post's Problem, see [24] . Their argument relies on the low basis theorem due to Jockusch and Soare [21] whose proof appears to require universality. Moreover, it is not entirely clear how to rephrase the entirety of Kucera's argument as a computational process. Fourth, Marchenkov's result in η-hyperhypersimple sets provides another approach to the construction of intermediate degrees, though it is not clear how this construction would avoid similar pitfalls as the standard priority argument. Lastly, one may question whether our definition of computational process is indeed appropriate. Any attempt to strengthen the computor seems to permit the existence of intermediate processes, albeit for the wrong reasons: the computor can hide essential parts of the computation from the observer. Strengthening the observer is similarly difficult since it tends to produce only complete processes, again for the wrong reasons.
